The U.S. Army now says the best way to survive a drone swarm attack may be to go underground, just like Iran has done for years with its missile and drone bases.
Quick Take
- Army guidance calls subterranean facilities “the most effective approach” against drone threats.
- Soldiers at Fort Bragg tested defenses against swarms of up to 100 drones in September.
- Iran already hides missile units and drone fleets in underground “missile cities.”
- A federal budget office warns no single weapon can stop every drone, pushing military planners toward layered defenses.
Army Drills Prepare for Massive Drone Swarms
Soldiers ran a major test called Scarlet Dragon 26-3 at Fort Bragg in September. They tested sensors, electronic jamming gear, command networks, and air defenses against coordinated drone swarms of up to 100 aircraft at once. The Army said the drill was built to pressure defensive networks with the scale and complexity troops could face in a real future fight.
The exercise reflects a growing fear inside the Pentagon. Cheap, mass-produced drones can now overwhelm expensive missile defense systems simply by sending more targets than those systems can shoot down. That math problem is forcing commanders to look beyond interceptors alone and consider protection that does not depend on hitting every single threat out of the sky.
Pentagon Doctrine Points Underground
An official Army publication, “The Evolving Protection Against Hostile Drones,” lays out the shift plainly. It states that passive defense works by first avoiding detection and then surviving an attack if detection fails, and that building survivability positions and fortifications is essential. The document goes further, declaring that “the use of subterranean facilities remains the most effective approach” against unmanned aircraft threats.
A Counter-UAS Lessons Learned Conference cited in the same material backs that up, concluding that moving command nodes, logistics, and other critical infrastructure underground is “the best defense” against the range of drone threats. The guidance also lists cheaper backup tools like earth berms, logs, nets, cages, decoys, and dispersed positions as ways to complement underground protection without needing a shooter for every incoming drone.
Iran’s Underground Playbook
Iran has already built the kind of infrastructure American planners are now studying. Reports on Iranian military infrastructure describe underground bases housing missile units, drone units, mobile launchers, reconnaissance and strike drones, and protected servicing areas and arsenals. Tehran’s “missile cities” are designed to preserve combat power and hide equipment from satellites and surveillance aircraft, giving Iran a model the U.S. now treats as a serious threat to study and counter.
That approach fits a pattern seen elsewhere, too. Forces in other recent conflicts have leaned on tunnels, dispersed positions, and hardened bunkers once persistent drone surveillance made sitting out in the open too dangerous. The common thread is simple: when cameras and sensors can watch a battlefield around the clock, hiding becomes as important as shooting back.
No Single Fix, Budget Office Warns
A Congressional Budget Office assessment titled “Options to Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems” states plainly that no single system gives full protection against complex drone threats. Instead, layered systems using different sensors and weapons together can cover each other’s weaknesses and boost overall protection. Defense analysts at the Center for a New American Security echo that conclusion, arguing that real resilience requires multiple sensor and effector types working together, not one silver-bullet gadget.
Not everyone agrees underground alone solves the problem. An Australian Army research paper warns that modern drone warfare can strip away the safety that hardened positions, underground shelters, and fortified structures once provided, as better sensors and precision strikes find new ways to reach buried targets. That tension shows the fight over survivability is far from settled, even as the Army leans harder into digging in.
Funding Fails to Match the Warnings
Despite years of warnings, defense budget documents show no major push to move vulnerable aircraft, fuel depots, command posts, and munitions underground, according to a review published by The Cipher Brief. That gap matters for taxpayers and troops alike. Washington can talk tough about countering Iran’s drone and missile threat, but without real construction dollars behind survivability projects, American forces risk facing the same exposed, above-ground vulnerabilities that recent conflicts have already exposed.
Sources:
military.com, home.army.mil, militarnyi.com, cnas.org, researchcentre.army.gov.au, thecipherbrief.com
